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LEGISLATIVE CONTROLS AS A RESPONSE TO
CONSUMER-CREDIT PROBLEMS
BARBARA A. CURRAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer-credit legislation consists of numerous statutes of vary-
ing length and complexity, which regulate the substance and form of
consumer-credit arrangements and the conduct of parties participating
in those arrangements. If adequacy and appropriateness of statutory
regulation of an activity were to be judged by the quantity of words
used by the legislature to express that regulation, consumer-credit
legislation would undoubtedly qualify as a highly successful effort. The
aggregate of consumer-credit regulation in all states, or in any one
state, does not, on balance, however, fulfill the promise made by the
quantity of words or the number of statutory provisions devoted to the
subject. Legislation regulating consumer credit is generally considered
unsatisfactory, and suggestions for improving it have been the subject
of what seems almost endless comment and irreconcilable diversity of
opinion.'
Consumer-credit legislation suffers from two readily observable
defects. The first is a matter of form. Statutory provisions regulating
consumer credit are poorly organized, subject to redundancies, and
unnecessarily complex. The second is a matter of substance. The legisla-
tion is an inadequate response to a felt need for melioration or resolu-
tion of problems perceived to exist in the consumer-credit market.
The inadequacy of the response is revealed in several ways—in
superficiality of treatment, in arbitrary limitation of scope, in ir-
relevancy of response to the problem, in half-measure controls that may
be more invidious than no controls at all, and in differential treatment
of several manifestations of the same underlying problem. Statutory
controls imposed for the purpose of achieving or approximating desig-
nated outcomes have, therefore, a curious propensity toward producing
unanticipated results.
The general uneasiness over existing legislation, the conflicting
and apparently irreconcilable arguments over the adequacy and ap-
propriateness of that legislation, and the readily observable defects in
legislative controls, noted above, are symptoms of a fundamental
* BA., University of Massachusetts, 1950; LL.B., University of Connecticut, 1953;
LL.M., Yale University, 1961; Research Attorney, American Bar Foundation.
1 See, e.g., the U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings on "Truth in Lending." Hearings
on S. 750 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
88th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1963-1964); on S. 1740, 87th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1961-
1962) ; on S. 2755, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
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epistemological difficulty underlying all consumer-credit legislation.
Inadequacies in legislation can be attributed to a general failure to
recognize and treat the consumer-credit problem as a total process
represented by the consumer-credit market. Instead, each symptom
of an underlying malfunctioning or imperfect operation of the market
has been treated as an isolated phenomenon, incidentally related to
other consumer-market problems, and the resultant legislative response,
being specialized to the symptom and not related to the underlying
cause, has not only failed to deal with the underlying cause, but has
been ineffectual in allaying the symptom. Even when it has been
recognized that consumer-credit regulation is regulation of some aspect
of a larger process, the creation of statutory controls has not reflected
this perception. Since problems have not been treated as arising out of
the operation of the larger process, legislation has been created without
a realistic appraisal, in most instances, of the causes of the problems
that the legislation is intended to resolve. This difficulty has been
further compounded by the fact that periodic reevaluation and revision
of statutory controls has been based on the assumption that prior
appraisals of consumer problems are valid. New or revised legislation
therefore reinforces inadequate responses by replicating earlier evalu-
ative errors.
These introductory remarks will be amplified in Section IV, A
Critique of Consumer-Credit Legislation. As a background for the
critique itself, this article will (1) review the role that legislation has
played in the development of the market and analyze the extent to
which the growth of the market has shaped the nature and scope of
regulation, (2) examine the similarity of controls imposed by legisla-
tion on all aspects of the market in all jurisdictions, and (3) explore
the substantive nature of the controls established.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSUMER-CREDIT LEGISLATION
The Uniform Small Loan Law. Enactment of consumer-credit
legislation accompanied the development of consumer-credit arrange-
ments as they were created to meet the needs of an expanding market.
Prior to the twentieth century, the credit activities of financial institu-
tions were limited to the business- and commercial-credit market.
Financial institutions granted credit to individual persons for personal
purposes only when amounts involved were substantial and only when
adequate collateral security in the form of real or personal property
was available. Since the wage earner desired only a small loan and had
no security other than the prospect of his future wages, financial insti-
tutions usually denied him credit for the acquisition of consumer goods
and services. Generally he was able to obtain such credit only from his
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employer, small retailers, and some private lenders. 2 Few commercial-
credit lenders engaged in consumer financing, because, in a growing
economy, the business-credit market represented a ready investment
outlet. Moreover, maximum rates of interest authorized under interest
and usury statutes were too low to provide an attractive yield to
lenders for a small loan repayable in installments.
The inability to obtain small loans from legitimate sources of
money often forced the hard-pressed wage earner to borrow at usurious
rates. The Uniform Small Loan Law, drafted in 1916 and thereafter
enacted in most states, was primarily a response to the plight of the
necessitous borrower who needed relatively small amounts of cash
and who could repay amounts borrowed only out of deductions from
future wages. 3 By authorizing substantially higher rates of interest
than were permitted under general interest and usury laws for install-
ment loans less than three hundred dollars,' the small loan law
encouraged commercial lenders to engage in the business of making
small loans to wage earners. Only lenders licensed under the provisions
of the small loan law were permitted to take advantage of the higher
interest charges authorized by it, and their activities were supervised
by a state administrative agency. Terms and conditions of the loan
contract, including maximum amount of loan, interest charge, duration
of loan, and method of repayment, were regulated by the law.'
Small loan laws patterned after the first and subsequent drafts
of the Uniform Small Loan Law are in force in most states today"
Consumer-finance companies, which presently hold about eight per
cent of outstanding consumer installment debt, are generally licensed
to operate under these small loan laws.' Although the provisions of
small loan laws presently in force are substantially the same as
the uniform act, there have been some major modifications in them
over the years. Maximum authorized loan amounts have been increased;
precomputation of rates has been authorized; refunds for prepayment
2 For particular examples of the credit that was available to the wage earner and
of the resultant abuses, see Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 1 Consumer
Installment Credit pt. 1 (1957) (general); Cash, The Mind of the South 189-238 (1941)
(employer, company store); Sinclair, The Jungle 54-62, 75-85, 118-20 (1906) (purchas-
ing real estate on installment contract).
3 The Uniform Small Loan Law was enacted primarily through the support and
effort of the Russell Sage Foundation. See Glenn, Brandt & Andrews, The Russell Sage
Foundation (1907-1946) 136-51, 336-50, 531-48 (1947). For a reprint of the original
Uniform Small Loan Law, see Hubachek, Annotations on Small Loan Laws 181-85
(1938). For a reprint of its seventh draft, see Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit
Legislation 144-57 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Curran].
4 The uniform act authorized 3% per month on the declining outstanding balance for
the first $100; 2% per month on the excess over $100.
5 See generally Curran 2, 6, 9, 15-45.
6 For materials on small loan laws generally, see id. at 15-45, 140-42, 158-93.
7 52 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1692 (1966).
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by borrowers may be calculated on the basis of the "Rule of 78"; and
charges for credit life, accident, and health insurance are permitted.
The effect of these modifications is to coordinate the regulation of
small loans made by licensees under the small loan laws with the
regulation of installment credit extended by other installment credit
lenders.'
The Industrial Loan. A development in consumer credit, con-
temporaneous with the Uniform Small Loan Law, was the emergence
of the industrial loan or "Morris Plan" loan. This Plan was devised
by Arthur J. Morris in 1910 as a means of overcoming the impediment,
created by general interest laws, to the extension of installment credit
to the wage earner. Under the Plan, the debtor agreed to repay the
principal amount of the loan in a lump sum at the end of a specified
period of time, such as a year, with interest calculated at the maximum
authorized statutory rate for the full period. At the same time, he
agreed to open with the lender a noninterest-bearing account wherein
he would periodically deposit amounts sufficient to pay off the loan
when it became due. The deposit account technically constituted
collateral for the loan. By this device, the lender was able to obtain a
greater yield on the loan, simply because he had the use of deposits
made while the original note was maturing.° Such loans were treated
as complying with general interest statutes.'°
Industrial banks were organized under different statutes and had
powers different from commercial banking institutions; their activities
expanded greatly during the two decades following 1910. The objective
of the founders and organizers of industrial banks was to create a
banking system that would specialize in servicing the consumer savings
and loan market. It was thought that a profitable enterprise could be
operated by limiting activities to consumer financing and banking.
Since the 1930's, however, small loan companies and commercial banks
have assumed a major share of this market. Nevertheless, industrial-
type loans may still be obtained from extant industrial banks and from
industrial-loan departments of commercial banks. 11
8 Curran 134.
9 Industrial banks customarily assessed a service fee in addition to the interest
charge.
10 See Saulnier, Industrial Banking Companies and Their Credit Practices 2-4, 29-31,
43-46 (1940).
1' For background, see Curran 52-55, 59-60; Saulnier, Industrial Banking Com-
panies and Their Credit Practices (1940). At the present time, about one-half of the states
have statutes regulating industrial loans as such. In most of these states, industrial-loan
makers are not only authorized to make the traditional industrial loan, taking the
deposit account as security, but they are also permitted to make installment loans at rates
higher than general interest rates without using the deposit-account security device. In a
number of states, industrial lenders are permitted to make installment loans under the
provisions of installment loan laws applicable to banks generally. For a fuller discussion,
see Curran 54-60, 141, 143, 204-19.
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Credit Unions. Credit unions were organized in the early part
of the twentieth century as a source of credit for consumers. They were
then, as they are now, cooperative societies of consumers with a
common interest, established to provide for their members a savings
facility and a source of small installment loans. Such organizations
were not authorized in all states. It was not until after enactment of the
Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 12 that the credit-union movement
expanded to become a significant participant in the consumer-credit
market. Today, most states have laws permitting the formation of
credit unions. These regulatory statutes authorize credit unions to
make loans repayable in installments at rates of interest in excess of
those permitted by general interest laws."
Retail Installment Sales Credit. By the 1920's, retail installment
sales credit—the prototype of contemporary retail sales credit—had
emerged. Prior to that time, sales credit was extended by retail sellers,
such as grocers and small neighborhood stores, but it was the increase
in consumers' discretionary income, together with the growth of the
automobile industry and the increase in production of other durable,
high-cost consumer goods such as washers, refrigerators, and vacuum
cleaners, that provided the impetus for mass marketing of goods on
an installment-credit basis?'
Under a retail installment sales credit arrangement, credit was
extended by the seller, and not by a financial institution, to the
purchaser, enabling the latter to take immediate delivery of the item
purchased and to pay for it thereafter in periodic installments. The
privilege of paying for the goods on time cost the purchaser an amount
over and above the price of the goods. This excess was often not identi-
fied to the purchaser as a separate charge for credit. In addition, the
seller usually retained a security interest in the goods sold until the
buyer paid all the installments. The seller might sell the credit contract
immediately to a sales financing agency for an amount less than the
aggregate amount of all installments to be paid under the contract?'
Sales credit was not considered a loan of money. Consequently,
12 48 Stat. 1216 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §1 1751-72 (Supp. 1966).
13 This is generally 1% per month on the declining outstanding balance, or ap-
proximately 12% per year. See Curran 45-52, 141, 143, 194-203.
14 See generally the four-part study of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
System, Consumer Installment Credit (1957). In particular, see pt. 1 (Growth and
Import) and pt. 4 (Financing New Car Purchases).
15 Automobile dealers, who traditionally have had to finance their own inventories,
customarily sold their paper to a financing agency, either a subsidiary of the automobile
manufacturer or an independent agency. Although some other retailers financed con-
sumer paper through their own subsidiary financing agencies, they more often dealt with
independent agencies. See Kripke, Inventory Financing of Hard Goods, 1956 U. Ill. L.F.
580; Skilton, Cars for Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Financing of Automobiles,
1957 Wis. L. Rev. 352.
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retail installment sales credit was not subject to any statutory regula-
tion, such as interest and usury laws, other than those imposed on
sales transactions generally.' The seller was considered to have dif-
ferent sales prices for goods—one price if the purchaser paid cash, and
a higher price if the purchaser deferred payment.
In 1935, Indiana enacted the first legislation regulating retail
installment sales credit, but by the close of World War II, only a few
additional states had moved in this direction." Most such legislation
has been enacted since 1957." The matters that are regulated by retail
installment sales credit statutes vary. Some acts apply to the credit
sale of automobiles only; 19
 some apply only to consumer goods other
than automobiles; others apply to both automobiles and other consumer
goods. All such statutes require that information relating to the
purchase price of the item and to the cost of financing be set forth in the
retail installment sales credit contract. Many statutes regulate the
maximum amount of the finance charge and related matters, such as
late charges and refunds. Many prohibit the inclusion of certain types
of contractual provisions relating to the creditors' remedies.' A number
of states require licensing of finance agencies that purchase retail
installment sales credit contracts. As a rule, however, there is no
regulation of the terms of the transaction by which the contract is
transferred by the original seller to a financing agency.".
Provisions of retail installment sales credit acts were orginally
drafted to regulate the traditional one-item or one-sale contract. Under
this arrangement, when a debtor made a new purchase, a new contract
76 The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to continue to apply the "time-price
doctrine" to retail installment sales contracts in 1952. In 1963, the Nebraska Supreme
Court characterized as interest the finance charges authorized under the Nebraska
Retail Installment Sales Act of 1959. For a fuller discussion of the time-price doctrine
and the Arkansas and Nebraska exceptions, see Curran 13-14, 83-90. For arguments pro
and con about the rationality of the doctrine, see Senate hearings on Truth-in-Lending
Bill, supra note 1.
17 Those states were Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin. In 1947,
Connecticut and Pennsylvania enacted similar legislation. 1 CCH Instalment Credit
Guide § 35 (1966) provides a quick reference for the effective dates of such legislation.
78 See ibid.
16 In 1951, the Federal Trade Commission promulgated trade-practice rules
regulating the sale and financing of motor vehicles. It was stated that it was an unfair
trade practice (a) for the seller or financing agency to make misleading or false statements
to the buyer about financing an automobile; (b) for the seller to fail to give specified
information about the cost of financing to the buyer; (c) for the seller to permit the
buyer to execute the credit contract in blank; and (d) for the seller or financing institution
to make purchase of insurance from a specified insurer a condition for granting credit.
16 C.F.R. § 197 (1960). See Note, Protection of Automobile Installment Buyers: The
FTC Steps In, 61 Yale L.J. 718 (1952).
20 For a comparison of various statutes, see Curran 91-123, 254-329, 348-78.
21 As to restrictions on dealer's reserve, see Curran 113-15. As to transferee of
seller as holder in due course, see N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9), 403(3)(a) (McKinney
Supp. 1966); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1966).
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would be executed covering that purchase only, or consolidating prior
and new purchases. In recent years, new types of arrangements, such
as revolving-credit and add-on contracts, permit the buyer to add new
purchases to his existing contract. These new devices are not neces-
sarily regulated under old retail installment sales credit acts. When
they are, special provisions relating to disclosure and finance charges
are usually added to such acts to take into account the special char-
acteristics of these new arrangements."
Role of Commercial Banks. Commercial banks played a minor
role in the consumer-credit market prior to the 1930's. Since then, their
share of the market has increased from less than 25 per cent of out-
standing consumer installment debt in 1939 to more than 40 per cent
by the third quarter of 1966." Today, banks participate in the market
both as direct lenders to consumers and as purchasers of consumer
retail installment sales credit paper. Although banks engage in sales
financing and are subject to provisions in retail installment sales credit
acts applicable to sales financing agencies, they are not usually required
to be licensed." As direct lenders, banks encountered difficulties similar
to those which other lenders encountered with general interest and usury
laws. Banks considered maximum rates permitted under those statutes
to be too low to yield an adequate return on small installment loans.
Consequently, in most states an exception was made to general interest
laws in order to permit baulks to charge consumers higher interest rates
for such loans.
The exception is embodied in statutes usually referred to as
installment loan laws. Provisions designating lenders as eligibile to
extend credit under such laws vary from state to state. In some states,
these laws are applicable only to certain categories of lenders, such as
financial institutions regulated by the state; in others, any person or
organization is permitted to take advantage of the more liberal
statutory interest maximum as long as he otherwise complies with the
provisions of the act. Eligible classes of lenders under installment
loan laws in all states include banks, however.' Despite their varia-
tions, they all permit authorized lenders to charge a rate of interest
in excess of that permitted under the general interest laws. To qualify
under the law, loans must be less than the maximum principal amount
specified in the statute and must be repayable in periodic installments."
In recent years, banks have experimented with making available
22 See generally Curran 93, 98-100, 102.
23 52 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1092 (1966). See also American Bankers Association, The
Commercial Banking Industry, Commercial Banks and Consumer Credit 162-89 (1962).
21 Curran 115.
25 See id. at 65-68, 226-43.
20 Id. at 69-75, 226-43.
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to consumers check-credit loans, revolving-credit accounts, and line-of-
credit arrangements. Few states have specific regulations covering such
innovations, but authority for them may be inferred from the terms
of the installment loan law. 27
Home-Improvement Loans. Although home-improvement loans
may usually be made under the general provisions of installment loan
laws, and credit extended by home-improvement contractors may be
subject to the general provisions of some retail installment sales credit
acts, many states have special statutory provisions applicable to home-
improvement financing. 28
 The expansion of the home-improvement
credit market was substantially accelerated by the passage of Title I
of the National Housing Act, under which the Federal Housing Com-
missioner is authorized to insure unsecured loans made for the purpose
of repair, alteration, or renovation of residential real property. 29 Loans
may qualify for insurance only if the requirements relating to maximum
finance charge, duration, and amount of loan established by the act are
met."
In order to take advantage of Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) insurance, however, the lending institution must also comply
with state laws. Although any lender eligible to make loans under a
state installment loan law may usually make FHA home-improvement
loans, some financial insitutions, such as savings and loan associations,
are prohibited by statute from making such loans. Consequently,
statutes have been enacted in most states permitting such institutions
to make loans complying with FHA requirements.' Furthermore, in
those states in which installment loan laws impose more restrictions on
loans than are specified in the National Housing Act, special exceptions
are made for FHA-insured home-improvement loans."
Effects of Piecemeal Legislation. As briefly sketched in the
preceding paragraphs, the pattern of enactment of consumer-credit
legislation approximated that of the development of the market. As
the market grew, and as new types of consumer-credit arrangements
were created, legislation was enacted applicable to those arrangements
or to new participants in the market. Prospective participants in this
market supported and often sponsored such new legislation since the
restrictions imposed by general usury laws prevented them from making
small installment loans. Consequently, the enactment of consumer-loan
27 Id. at 76-79.
28 A small number of states regulate home-improvement financing in a separate
statute. Id. at 93-94.
29 68 Stat. 596 (1954), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1715k (Supp. 1965).
30 48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (Supp. 1965). See also 24
C.F.R. § 201 (1966); Curran 63-64.
81 Id. at 60-65, 220-25.
33 Id. at 75-76.
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statutes was a process of successively carving out exceptions to the
existing interest and usury laws. This new legislation, however, was
not formally related to, or integrated with, statutes previously enacted.
The predictable outcome of this piecemeal legislation was the accumula-
tion of the numerous statutes still in effect in each state—all relating
to the consumer-credit market, but each regulating a different class of
credit arrangement.
The primary function of consumer-loan legislation was to relax
the controls imposed by what was essentially a price-fixing statute,
i.e., the general interest and usury law. Many provisions in such statutes
that seem to regulate other matters are simply dealing with some aspect
of the process of regulating credit cost. 33
 However, some statutes, and
small loan laws in particular, also regulate, in a limited way, matters
other than maximum credit cost." Lenders already in the market, to the
extent that they resisted such enabling legislation, did so at least partly
out of a desire to minimize competition. This resistence also materially
shaped the nature of the legislation and its impact on the market.
Legislators tended to authorize different maximum rates for different
types of loans and lenders. As a result, some lenders who operated
under statutes permitting high loan rates had almost exclusive access
to certain segments of the market.'
Regulation of retail installment sales credit succeeded the emer-
gence of that type of credit by more than thirty years in most states.
As noted above, retail installment sales credit was not subject to
interest and usury laws. Since prospective participants were not
excluded from the market by any existing regulation, they did not
pressure for legislation as prospective lenders had to do. Whereas
consumer-loan legislation was initially a response to pressure for
broader participation and, in some measure, for more competition,
in the market, retail installment sales credit legislation was essentially
a response to pressure for elimination of abuses occurring within an
unregulated market.
Imposition of a duty to disclose specified information relating to
the cost of credit was the common characteristic of all retail installment
sales credit legislation. Additional controls, such as ceilings on finance
33 For instance, there are provisions relating to refunds upon prepayment of loans,
to refinancing, and to maximum duration of loan.
34 E.g., advertising. See Curran 35-42, 50-52, 58-59, 74-75.
35 E.g., licensed small loan lenders, in particular. It would not have been an
entirely unreasonable experiment to have allowed full competition by authorizing rates
for all lenders in line with those permitted under small loan laws or by eliminating
ceilings altogether. The resistance of lenders already in the market was not the only
operative factor impeding such a move. The almost religious devotion to long-established
general interest ceilings on the part of the community should not be underestimated as a
significant factor. For further discussion of ceilings, see Curran 158-66, 194-219, 226-43.
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charges and the prohibition of certain contractual provisions, never
were included in such acts in the absence of disclosure provisions—
although the reyerse was often the case."
The imposition of rate controls in retail installment sales credit
legislation is, in a sense, a form of disclosure—not effective credit
price control. As no attempt is made in such acts to regulate the price
of the item purchased, the seller is at liberty to increase its cost and
thereby insure a particular yield on the sale. In sales situations where
the buyer is unable to compare prices and related information, the
imposition of finance-charge ceilings, even coupled with the disclosure
of the cash price of the item sold, is of questionable value as a method
of price control. As a result, it may be viewed as a control on the
maximum amount that may be stated to be finance charges.
III. COMPARISON OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS REGULATING
CONSUMER CREDIT
Statutory provisions regulating both loans and credit sales have,
over the years, become increasingly similar in form and substance,
despite differences in their initial objectives and ultimate market
impact. This section will examine the similarities and differences in
these provisions.
Laws regulating consumer-credit arrangements exist in all states.'
As noted above, large quantities of statutory materials deal with dif-
ferent types of consumer-credit arrangements and with different phases
of the consumer-creditor relationship. Statutes tend to be specialized
to particular consumer-credit arrangements that are classified not only
on the basis of the characteristics of those arrangements, but also on
the basis of the identity of the credit institution. Thus, small loan acts
apply to consumer loans made by small loan licensees; installment
loan laws usually apply to consumer loans made by banking institu-
tions; and retail installment sales credit acts apply to consumer credit
extended by sellers of goods or services. Special statutes regulate
consumer loans made by credit unions, savings and loan associations,
industrial banks, and pawnbrokers. A few statutes, however, regulate
a particular aspect of the consumer-creditor relationship without being
restricted to specific arrangements. Credit-insurance laws and general
disclosure laws, for example, apply, with some exceptions, to consumer-
credit arrangements generally, without regard to the usual classifica-
tions established for the purpose of statutory regulation.
The specialization of legislation to particular arrangements has
resulted in the now characteristic fragmentation of statutory regula-
36 See generally id. at 91-123.
37 Id. at 140-43, 254-55.
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Lion of the consumer-credit market. In spite of this, a comparative
analysis of that legislation reveals two significant facts. First, among
different jurisdictions there are substantial similarities in statutory
provisions regulating the same types of credit arrangements. Second,
in any given jurisdiction, and among jurisdictions, there are similarities
in statutory provisions regulating different types of credit arrangements
insofar as such provisions actually regulate the same aspects of the
consumer-credit process. Terminology of ten tends to obscure such
similarities."
Although differences exist among jurisdictions in respect to items
that one would expect to be varied, such as the amount of the ceiling
specified for finance charges, the basic nature and scope of the regula-
tion of such charges are usually the same; differences tend to be in
degree rather than in character. A shift in emphasis of regulation from
one aspect of the consumer-creditor relationship to another is the basis
for differences observed in legislation covering different arrangements.
The incidence of regulation of certain phases of the consumer-creditor
relationship may be higher for one class of arrangements than for
others. For example, the emphasis in retail installment sales credit acts
has traditionally been on disclosure to the consumer of information
relating to the nature and scope of the obligation and of the cost of
credit. On the other hand, emphasis in installment loan laws has been
on control of the rate of the loan charge Consequently, as noted above,
all installment loan acts set maximum rates of charge, and all retail
installment sales credit acts require disclosure. In addition, some
installment loan acts contain provisions requiring disclosure, and a
number of retail installment sales credit acts contain provisions limiting
finance charges. 39 When regulation of the same subject matter occurs
in acts that apply to different classes of arrangements, similarity of
treatment may be observed.
A survey of consumer-credit legislation also indicates that, if the
coverage of laws regulating different classes of arrangements continues
to expand at the rate that it has in the past, and along the same patterns
as in the past, such laws will increasingly deal with the same aspects
of the consumer-creditor relationship, and the substance of regulation
contained in such laws will become increasingly the same. An example
of the trend to similarity in regulatory treatment of different arrange-
38 For example, provisions regulating minimum refunds of unearned finance charges
are the same in a variety of consumer-credit laws. Generally, the minimum refund is
based on the Rule of 78 (computation formula) in retail installment sales credit acts,
id. at 288-92, in installment loan acts, id. at 226-43, in some industrial-loan acts, id.
at 204-19, and in small loan acts that permit precomputation of interest. See id. at 167-69
for a collection and summary of statutes containing prepayment provisions.
39 For a discussion of rate ceilings in retail installment sales credit acts, see id. at
266-69; for disclosure provisions in installment loan acts, see id. at 229-33, 235, 238, 240-43.
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ments may be seen in revisions relating to the computation of loan
charges in small loan acts.
A characteristic provision of state laws patterned after the Uni-
form Small Loan Law is that loan charges must be computed from
month to month on the basis of the declining principal balance of the
loan. During the last decade, however, many small loan acts have been
amended to permit lenders to precompute loan charges. 4° A provision
that authorizes precomputation is usually accompanied by other pro-
visions requiring refunds of unearned charges in the event the borrower
prepays any loan, and by provisions authorizing the assessment of
delinquency and deferral charges. The precomputation authorization
and the supplementary provisions make the substance of the interest-
calculation sections of small loan laws comparable to the finance-charge-
calculation provisions found in most retail installment sales credit acts
and installment loan acts.
A comparative analysis of consumer-credit statutes, therefore,
reveals that there exists an overall trend in consumer-credit legislation
toward a uniformity in regulation of the same aspect of the consumer-
creditor relationship, for all classes of arrangements and for all creditors
participating in the consumer-credit market. This trend, however, is
obscured by the fragmented nature of consumer-credit legislation.
IV. THE NATURE OF STATUTORY CONTROLS IMPOSED IN
CONSUMER-CREDIT LEGISLATION
The fact that the similarities described above exist among state
statutes regulating consumer credit simplifies review and analysis of
the nature of the controls that those statutes impose. It is unnecessary,
for purposes of the general discussion here, to deal, except by way
of example, with the innumerable minor" variations in the provisions
of those statutes.
Any statute specialized to consumer credit regulates one or more
of the four following aspects: (1) the access of creditors to the market;
(2) the information the creditor must give to the consumer; (3) the
terms and conditions of the consumer-credit arrangement; and (4)
the remedies of consumer and creditor when either has not satis-
40 Under such a provision, the lender may compute all loan charges at the time
that the loan is made, based on the assumption that the loan will be repaid in accordance
with the agreed schedule of installments. In addition, he may add these loan charges to
the principal amount of the loan and divide that figure by the number of scheduled
installments in order to determine the amount of each installment payment.
41 The variations are not "minor" for participants in the market. "Minor," as used
here, is intended to mean that the basic nature and scope of controls can be dealt with
without dealing with all the variations of each type of control. For example, controls on
cost of credit can be discussed without dealing with all the variations in maximum-
finance-charge provisions in all states.
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factorily performed his obligations under the consumer-credit arrange-
ment."
A. Access to the Market
Access to and participation in the consumer-credit market are
regulated formally by licensing provisions and informally by maximum
finance charges. In some cases, limitation on access restricts competition
among responsible creditors; in other cases, it excludes marginal or
irresponsible operators."
1. Licensing. Licensing is required of credit institutions that want
to make loans under the authorization of small loan laws and, in some
states, of credit institutions that want to engage in the business of
purchasing retail installment sales credit paper from sellers." The
extent to which licensing requirements operate to exclude potential
participants from any portion of the market depends, of course, on
the conditions imposed upon securing a license.
When the licensing requirement is primarily a revenue-raising
device, potential licensees often need only file the appropriate forms
and pay the required fee. The fact that a creditor possesses such a
license may mislead the public into thinking that the state licensing
agency considers the licensee to be competent, honest, qualified by
experience, or financially able to engage in the licensed activity. In
fact, however, issuance of the license itself does not connote any prior
investigation by the licensing agency, and, consequently, it cannot be
considered as the agency's endorsement of the licensee's character and
fitness.
When licensing provisions require the licensing agency to deter-
mine that the applicant has met enumerated qualifications, and when
those qualifications are something more than paying a license fee and
filing the required forms, then participation in the regulated consumer-
credit activity is more likely to be restricted. Qualifications for securing
licenses may relate to the character and fitness of the applicant as
indicated, in some measure, by the pattern of his past activities. Under
such conditions, the marginal operator, possessing inadequate or dubi-
ous qualifications, is presumably excluded from participating in the
42 In a sense, regulation of the terms and conditions of the arrangement also
operates to regulate rights and remedies available to the contracting parties. The remedies
referred to in item (4) are those rights and remedies that arise by operation of law and
are dealt with by the statute without regulation of the stated terms or conditions of the
contract, e.g., rights of creditor and debtor upon repossession of goods.
43 See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer-Credit Trans-
actions, p. 542 infra.
44 In a very few states, designated nonlicensees may make loans under the provis-
ions of the small loan law. See, e.g., Mass, Gen. Laws Ann, ch. 140, § 114A (Supp. 1966).
As to licensing of sales financing agencies, see Curran 115-77, 323-29.
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market as a licensee under the particular act in question." He may,
however, be able to engage in a similar activity in a segment of the
market that is not so regulated.
Additional qualifications, set forth in licensing provisions of small
loan laws, relate, not to control of legitimacy of operation, but to alloca-
tion of market share. Under such laws, the licensing agency must be
satisfied "that allowing such applicant to engage in [the] business
[of small loans] will promote the convenience and advantage of the
community in which the licensed office is to be located . . . •"" This
provision has been applied to refuse licenses to organizations which
might otherwise qualify on the basis of "financial responsibility, ex-
perience, character, and general fitness . . . such as to command the
confidence of the public and to warrant belief that the business will be
operated lawfully, honestly, fairly, and efficiently, within the purposes
of [the] ... Act . .
2. Maximum Finance Charges. When small loan laws were first
enacted, the "convenience and advantage" test operated to exclude
qualified but unlicensed lenders from participating in the consumer-
loan market, because only the licensees could charge interest rates
above those provided in general interest laws. When consumer-loan
legislation was thereafter enacted to permit other lenders to make
consumer loans at rates higher than general interest ceilings, the effect
of small loan licensing provisions on the market was modified. Non-
licensees were still prohibited from extending credit at the high rates
authorized under small loan laws, but they were no longer completely
excluded from participating in the consumer-loan market."
When statutory ceilings on interest, as well as restrictions on the
maximum amount of loans, are not the same for those engaged in the
market, they operate to restrict participation and, consequently, com-
petition. As noted in Section II above, the consumer-loan market has
been made more accessible to new participants as a result of the enact-
ment of a series of statutes by which interest restrictions under general
interest laws were relaxed for specified classes of lenders. Any person
or organization ineligible to make loans under any of those statutes is,
as a practical matter, also precluded from engaging in the business
of making consumer loans to the extent that general interest ceilings
45 The extent to which such licensing requirements exclude potential participants
from the market depends, however, not only upon the conditions to be satisfied but
also upon the energy of, and resources available to, the licensing agency in exercising
the powers granted to it.
46 Uniform Small Loan Law § 4(b) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1942).
44 Ibid.
48 Sanctioning provisions aim at excluding participants by permitting licensing
agencies to revoke licenses of those who violate the spirit or letter of the act.
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produce insufficient yields on such loans. It may, however, engage in
credit-sales financing.
In summary, the statutory provisions, noted above, that affect
access to and participation in the consumer-credit market produce a
curious effect. They do not completely exclude marginal operators from
the market, but they do reduce competition among responsible credit
institutions. To the extent that the objective of such provisions is to
exclude entirely from the market the organization that engages in
objectionable activities, it succeeds, under the best conditions, in ex-
cluding any such operator only from engaging in the activity which is
subject to the licensing requirements. The operator may still engage
in a consumer-credit activity for which a license is not required and
which may or may not be otherwise regulated by statute.
B. Exchange of Information
Consumer-credit laws require that specified information be pro-
vided by the creditor to the consumer disclosing the cost and terms of
the consumer-credit arrangement." The purpose to be achieved by so
informing the consumer depends upon the nature of that information
and the circumstances under which it is to be disclosed.
Disclosure provisions in consumer-credit laws have two objectives.
The first is to provide the consumer with information that will enable
him to make an intelligent appraisal as to which of the available credit
arrangements is best suited to his needs and objectives or, at the least,
to make an intelligent decision as to whether he should undertake a
particular credit obligation. The second is to provide a statement of
the terms and conditions of a consumer-credit obligation already in-
curred and to inform the consumer of his rights and duties under that
contractual arrangement. The extent to which the information so pro-
vided can be or is effectively utilized by consumers is a matter for
conjecture.'
A number of statutes require creditors to provide the consumer
with information relating to contract terms prior to the consummation
of the agreement. 5 ' A few such statutes require the creditor to give the
consumer a written statement of credit charges.' Such provisions,
4° Consumer-credit laws, most notably small loan laws, regulate disclosure of such
information partly by establishing controls on advertisements. Curran 38, 58, 74. Under
such regulations, the creditor is not, however, required to disclose specified information.
He is required to conform to statutory requirements only if he elect's to disclose certain
information in his advertisements.
50 For a general discussion of disclosure, see Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of
Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285 (1966).
51 See Curran 39.
52 See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Laws § 191A-2 (Supp. 1965) ; N.H. Rev. Slat. Ann. §
399-11:2 (Supp. 1965) ; 16 C.F.R. § 197 (1960).
423
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
however, do not guarantee that the statements will be given to the
consumer under circumstances that will permit him to reflect upon
their contents prior to committing himself to a particular contract.
If the value of precontractual written statements is questionable,
then statutory provisions that make the contract form itself a dis-
closure instrument are even more questionable. All retail installment
sales credit acts and many consumer-loan laws require that certain
information be included in the contract form. Under retail installment
sales credit acts in particular, such contracts are expected to perform
the double task of disclosing to the consumer the nature of the ar-
rangement before contractual obligations are incurred and of being a
written memorial of the obligation after the contract has been executed.
For example, retail installment sales credit acts provide that the in-
stallment sales contract be identified as such and that it include an
itemization of charges, including the cost of the goods or services, the
cost of the finance charge and other charges, the amount and due date
of each installment, and the number of installments. The creditor may
also be required to inform the consumer of rights and obligations
arising by operation of law, such as the consumer's right of redemption
in case of repossession of the goods and his obligation to pay any de-
ficiency if the sale of the repossessed goods does not cover the balance
owing under the contract. Such information must be stated conspicu-
ously in the contract—often in bold-face type or in capital letters. The
creditor is often required to include in the contract clear instructions to
the consumer not to sign it until he reads it thoroughly and it is com-
pletely filled in. The legal effect of an acknowledgement may often be
stated in the contract.
Small loan laws require inclusion of important items, such as the
amount of the loan and the credit cost, whereas bold-face type and
special legends are not usually required. In addition, however, the
lender is, under most such acts, required to deliver to the borrower
along with the executed contract a statement setting forth other signi-
ficant terms of the arrangement. 53
If provisions in the contract form are to disclose information
sufficient to permit the consumer to make an intelligent decision, then
he must be given an opportunity not only to read the form but to reflect
upon the information provided in, it. In most cases, negotiation of
terms may seem to the consumer to be complete when the contract
is presented to him for his signature. He therefore believes that the
delivery of the contract form is merely part of the execution of the
formal legal documents which evidence the negotiated agreement. For
a disclosure requirement to have practical meaning, it is probably
53 For provisions in other consumer-loan laws, see Curran 204-19, 226-43.
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necessary to require that the consumer be provided with (1) reason-
able time to read the contract carefully if he so wishes, and (2) a clear
statement that the unexecuted contract is given to him not only for the
purpose of signing it, but also for use in deciding whether to undertake
the obligation.
One of the most significant developments in precontractual dis-
closure was the inclusion in the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales
Act of 1966 of a provision applying to door-to-door credit sales." This
provision gives the consumer a specified period of time after signing the
retail installment sales credit contract and before delivery of "a sub-
stantial part" of the goods or services during which he may notify the
creditor that he does not intend to assume the obligation represented by
the contract. If the consumer so informs the creditor, he is relieved of all
obligations under the contract.' If such a provision attended all credit-
sale transactions and insured proper notice to the consumer of his right
to cancel, there would be true meaning to the precontractual disclosure
requirements currently in force in most acts." The significance of the
Massachusetts provision, when coupled with standard disclosure pro-
visions, lies in the fact that the consumer is assured by statute of having
sufficient time and information to make a reflective decision as to
whether he should incur a specific obligation.
Retail installment sales credit legislation has emphasized the pre-
contractual disclosure function of the contract form. However, many
consumer-credit laws, including retail installment sales credit acts, also
require that the executed contract form include all the terms and con-
ditions of the arrangement, and that the creditor deliver to the con-
sumer a copy of the executed contract. These requirements are in-
tended to insure that the consumer has a complete statement of his
obligation. It is unlikely, however, that many consumers actually read
these documents. The consumer has, or thinks he has, a general notion
of the nature of his obligation and probably expects to refer to the con-
tract only if a dispute arises. Moreover, even if the consumer were to
read the contract, he might have difficulty understanding some parts of
it and would probably be unaware of the legal implications of many of
its provisions. Knowledge of the contractual terms, or of their legal im-
plications, becomes crucial for the consumer when his rights under the
54 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp. 1966).
55 The consumer has until 5:00 p.m. on the next business day to give notice of
cancellation.
54 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255D, § 9D (Supp. 1966). The notice to the
consumer is to be included in at least ten-point type under the heading "Notice to
Buyer" and above the place where the consumer is to sign the agreement. If the seller
takes a security interest in the goods, five other items are also included in this notice. If
he takes no security interest, three other items are included.
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contract, in order to be preserved, must be seasonably exercised.' In
order to solve this problem, many statutes, particularly retail install-
ment sales credit acts, require special legends and notices to be set forth
conspicuously in the contract.
Generally, legislators must make a value judgment as to which dis-
closure provisions ought to be emphasized, since any contractual pro-
vision may, under certain circumstances, be of importance to the con-
sumer. The difficulty of selection is compounded by the fact that the
contract form is often expected to serve also as an instrument for
precontractual as well as postcontractual disclosure. Different informa-
tion is necessary for each type.58 Some jurisdictions have placed too
much emphasis on too many disclosure provisions. Such an approach,
however, tends toward a point of marginal utility."
In addition to requiring information to be disclosed in the contract
form, statutes also require the creditor to provide certain information
to the consumer during the term of the contract. In some cases, such
information (e.g., periodic statements of account) is merely a method
of notifying the consumer of the extent to which he has performed his
contractual obligation." Other information is intended to apprise the
consumer of contract rights that he may wish to exercise. For example,
the transferee of the credit obligation may be required not only to
notify the consumer of the transfer of the obligation itself, but also to
inform the consumer that, in order to assert against the transferee a
claim arising out of the original transaction, he must notify the trans-
feree of such claim within a specified period of time.'
Although statutory disclosure requirements impose a major burden
on a contract, the usual function of which is only to state in full the
terms and conditions of the parties' agreement, the selection of the
contract form as the means of supplying precontractual and postcon-
tractual disclosure is not necessarily inappropriate. However, if the
document is to serve these functions, statutory provisions must go
further than merely making the contract form the repository for a
collection of disclosure provisions. At a minimum, a distinction should
be made between information that is relevant for precontractual dis-
57 For example, in order to assert against the transferee of the seller claims held
against the seller, the consumer must, under the New York statute, notify the transferee
of those claims. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9), 403(3) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
Another example is the buyer's right of redemption when goods have been repossessed.
See Curran 111-12.
58 For example, the amount of the credit charge is important to the consumer while
he is contemplating assuming a credit obligation. After execution of the contract, how-
ever, it is not as important as information relating to timely assertion of rights against
a transferee of the credit contract.
59 See Curran 293-300.
60 Id. at 39, 109.
61 See, e.g., N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 302(9), 403(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
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closure and that which is relevant for postcontractual disclosure. The
consumer should be made aware of this distinction and the purpose for
which these provisions are included in the contract. Finally, if precon-
tractual disclosure is to be provided by way of the contract form,
statutory provisions must assure that the consumer not only recognizes
its purpose but also, if he wishes, has an opportunity to utilize the
information disclosed.
C. Terms and Conditions of the Arrangement
As a general rule, negotiations between the parties to a consumer-
credit arrangement deal with only a portion of the matters covered in
the final contract. Negotiable terms usually relate to matters that are
peculiar to each arrangement, such as the principal amount of the
obligation, the duration of the contract, the amount and due date of
installment payments, and, in some cases, the inclusion of insurance
protection and a provision for collateral security. The cost of credit
and other terms which deal primarily with the rights of the creditor and
the duties of the debtor are not usually subject to negotiation.
Consumer-credit contracts are standard, printed documents with
blank spaces for the negotiated items noted above. Standardized,
preprinted contract forms save creditors time and money. Consumer
credit is generally marketed and serviced on a mass basis like any high-
volume, low-unit-price item of standard specifications. Under such cir-
cumstances, contract negotiations with the consumer must be expedi-
tiously carried out by low-priced, nonprofessional personnel represent-
ing the creditor. Such personnel need only know which standard form
to use for the particular arrangement and how to fill in its blank spaces
in order to prepare it for execution by the parties. Terms of consumer-
credit arrangements, when standardized, permit ease of administration
and extend cost savings to the consumer. Moreover, standardization
facilitates the original creditor's sale of credit contracts to financing
agencies.
The use of "boilerplate" contract forms also operates, however, to
the disadvantage of the consumer. Under present market conditions,
and in spite of disclosure provisions noted in the preceding section, the
consumer does not bargain with the creditor in respect to contract
terms, but merely signs the standard contract as offered. Standard
printed contracts favor the creditor and protect his interests to a much
greater extent than if he had to bargain over terms. Consumer-credit
contracts are prepared by expert legal counsel on behalf of the creditor
and provide him with the maximum amount of protection that the law
permits.
It is not surprising that the drafter of the contract forms provides
every possible protection for the credit institution without comparable
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concern for the consumer. Such documents are designed to be used in
all consumer-credit arrangements, regardless of the character or credit-
worthiness of any individual consumer. The form contract also provides
the creditor with an arsenal of remedies, thereby permitting him to
extend credit with minimal precontractual credit investigation that
might otherwise be required.
It would seem that the consumer's only leverage against the credi-
tor is to threaten not to enter into the arrangement. In many cases,
however, such a power may be illusory. The loss of one customer may
not be as significant a factor to the creditor in the operation of his busi-
ness as the decision not to undertake that particular credit obligation
may be to the consumer. Theoretically, of course, the consumer may
take his business elsewhere. However, with the increasing standardiza-
tion of credit contracts, it is unlikely that competitors will offer the
consumer significantly different terms, with the possible exception of
credit cost.
Finally, the execution of standard contracts by the creditor's non-
professional representative further limits the consumer's ability to
bargain for contract terms or for changes in printed provisions. The
representative is often as ignorant of the significance of printed contract
terms as the consumer, and is not usually authorized to make changes in
those portions of the contract. Consequently, in the present consumer-
credit market, the creditor, for all practical purposes, controls all the
terms of the contract other than those that must be adjusted for each
arrangement.
Provisions in consumer-credit contracts deal primarily with the
consumer's contractual duties and the rights and remedies of the
creditor if the consumer breaches.' Statutory regulation of the content
of such contracts reflects a recognition of the consumer's inability to
adequately protect his interests. Such regulation is intended to alleviate
harsh effects occasioned by enforcement by some creditors of contract
terms that are not the product of bilateral negotiations and that legis-
lators seem to think unfair.
Although consumer-credit contract terms are often standardized,
they are not established by statute; they are, however, regulated in
two principal ways. First, some restrictions are imposed on contract
provisions relating to matters that are the subject of negotiation, such
as the amount and due date of installments. Subject to such restrictions,
the creditor and consumer are free to modify these terms." As noted
62 Contract provisions do not reinforce remedies of the consumer. In fact the reverse
may be the case. For example, some retail installment sales credit contracts have provided
that the consumer, by signing the document, agrees not to assert against the original
seller or his transferee any claims arising out of the underlying transaction.
63 For example, a statute may prohibit a "balloon" installment by requiring that all
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above, most provisions in consumer-credit contracts relate to the duties
of the consumer and the rights of the creditor. Consequently, the
second type of statutory control over contract provisions is that which
prohibits the inclusion of provisions that strengthen the creditor's
remedies by enlarging the scope of existing remedies, by restricting
debtor's remedies, or by reinforcing the creditor's position in relation to
security. Examples of provisions so prohibited include those permitting
the creditor to accelerate installment payments for any reason other
than the debtor's default; those permitting the debtor to agree not to
assert against the creditor or his transferee a right arising out of the
underlying transaction; or those permitting confession of judgment.
Certain types or amounts of security may also be prohibited. For ex-
ample, some retail installment sales credit acts prohibit the taking of
collateral such as a wage assignment or a lien on real estate. In addi-
tion, the creditor may not be permitted to take a security interest in
goods other than those that are the subject matter of the underlying
sales transaction."
All consumer-loan statutes, and many retail installment sales
credit acts, impose ceilings on the amount of finance charges or
interest. As noted earlier, these ceilings differ as to various credit
arrangements and classes of creditors. Whenever rates are regulated,
other matters relating to the cost of credit are also regulated, including
methods of calculating charges, special charges, fees, and prepayment
credits. It is not easy to assess the practical effect of these controls on
the market and on individual contractual arrangements.
It should be clearly understood that statutes setting rate ceilings
only limit the amount that a creditor may charge for the extension of
credit. They do not purport to fix, or otherwise regulate, the charges
made by the creditor. Ceilings are set in order to prevent creditors from
charging unreasonably high rates, while permitting rates generally to
be fixed by market conditions. The complex pattern of rate controls in
many jurisdictions makes it difficult, however, to evaluate the extent
to which those ceilings are an effective measure for protecting con-
sumers against what legislatures have declared to be exorbitant
charges." Different ceilings apply to different types of arrangements
installments be substantially equal in amount and period. Amount and number of install-
ments are also affected by statutory provisions limiting the maximum duration of the
contract.
64 For types of prohibited provisions in retail installment sales credit acts, see
Curran 312-22. Generally speaking, statutory prohibitions against certain types of
contractual provisions occur with greater frequency in retail installment sales legislation
than in consumer-loan legislation. Restrictions relating to security occur more frequently
in consumer-loan laws. See, for small loan laws, id. at 36-37; for industrial-loan laws,
id. at 58-59; for installment loan laws, id. at 73-74; and for credit-union loan laws,
id. at 50-51.
65 "Unreasonable charges" are those which the legislature labels such. Legislatures
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and classes of creditors. Some arrangements, such as retail installment
sales credit contracts, may not be subject to any ceilings. Consequently,
the sharp operator, against whom the consumer is supposedly being
protected, may, in many jurisdictions, participate in the market subject
to no rate controls at all by electing to extend credit of a type that is
subject to no ceiling.
Ceilings do not always function simply as outside limits to credit
charges. In some cases, they may in fact approximate what would be
the going rate absent any rate controls. Sometimes, because of the
character of the market, the ceiling tends also to shape the amount of
the going rate in a manner not unlike what a rate-fixing control would
do. In general, ceilings will exceed going rates at any given time. The
problem is that the establishment of ceilings presupposes a pattern of
price behavior that has not existed in the past and does not now exist in
the consumer-credit market. The absence of rate controls, other than the
ceilings, indicates that consumer finance charges are expected to be
responsive not only to fluctuation in the cost of money generally but
also to competition among creditors within the consumer-credit market
and, in some measure, to the individual consumer-creditor bargaining
process.
Competitive pricing of credit charges among creditors cannot be
expected to occur, however, as long as consumers as a group remain
indifferent to credit costs. This lack of consumer sensitivity has meant
that the cost of credit has not been a significant factor influencing selec-
tion by the consumer of one credit arrangement over another. Other
factors, such as ease in obtaining credit, liberality of repayment terms,
and availability of alternative arrangements, tend to shape the con-
sumer's decision to undertake a particular arrangement. As a result,
competition for customers is directed at these matters rather than at
credit cost itself."
Although other factors may be involved in producing market
rates, consumer pressure for lower rates does not operate to prevent
them from drifting toward statutory ceilings. It does not necessarily
follow, however, that rates should be regulated in some other fashion
or that they should not be regulated at all. Ceiling rates may be an
entirely appropriate way to deal with the problem of these creditors
seem to arrive at criteria for deciding upon ceilings from information about going rates
in the market and ceilings in other jurisdictions. The determination is, in many cases,
based on inadequate and conflicting statements as to what going rates are, and is not
based on criteria that are entirely objective or fully articulated.
66 For a full discussion of consumer sensitivity to rates, see Juster & Shay, Consumer
Sensitivity to Finance Rates: An Empirical and Analytical Investigation (1964) ; Mors,
Consumer Credit Finance Charges: Rate Information and Quotation (1965). Both
were products of a consumer-credit study conducted by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
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who, if given the opportunity, would charge rates that are far in excess
of market rates. If, however, ceiling rates, rather than broader rate
control, are justified on the basis that going rates will always be reason-
able because they reflect competitive pricing in the market, then other
controls may be necessary to insure that the market produces that
result.
Proponents of uniform precontractual rate disclosure expect to
promote competitive pricing by increasing consumer awareness of the
credit-cost problem. Present disclosure requirements have, for the
reasons noted above, failed to realize this objective. Moreover, as long
as such provisions remain in their present form, they will probably con-
tinue to fail to foster consumer sensitivity to credit costs. The lack of
consumer concern, in turn, tends to reduce price competition among
lenders. Furthermore, if statutory controls tend to exclude some
creditors from extending certain types of credit, the effect may be to
limit the number of alternative arrangements available to the consumer,
thereby reducing any gains attained by increasing consumer sensitivity
to rates. Consequently, other revisions in existing consumer-credit
legislation may be necessary. If other controls are not imposed, existing
controls, although ceilings nominally, will continue to take on the
characteristics of price-fixing.
D. Regulation of Remedies
Although restriction of creditor remedies is often viewed both as
a means of controlling inequitable arrangements and as a means of
discouraging extensions of risky credit, statutory provisions restricting
creditor remedies or strengthening consumer remedies arising by opera-
tion of law are neither numerous nor substantial!" By focusing on
creditor remedies that arise by operation of law, many proponents of
reform often fail to confront the central issue by confusing the problem
of unfairness of an original bargain with unfairness of the creditor's
remedies for breach of the bargain. Pressure to weaken such remedies
arises primarily because of those cases in which the initial obligation
seems particularly unfair to the consumer and where application of
creditor remedies can mean substantial economic disruption for the
consumer. Care must be taken, however, not to characterize the prob-
lem as one arising out of harsh creditor remedies when it essentially
stems from abuses occurring in the process of bargain and exchange.
In a great number of cases in which the creditor asserts his rights
against the consumer, the creditor has a valid claim but the consumer
does not. Statutory weakening of creditors' remedies will not remove
67 Regulation of contractual provisions is a form of regulation of remedies. See
note 42 supra, and see generally Felsenfeld, supra note 43, at 555 -65.
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abuses which occur when the creditor takes unfair advantage of the
consumer at the inception of the arrangement. Although weakening of
remedies may make creditors more cautious about entering the market,
it is entirely possible that it may be the responsible creditors that be-
come cautious and not the marginal operators.
A problem arises as to how much contract terms which create or
strengthen creditor remedies should be regulated to prevent the creditor
from weighting the contract in his favor. It may also be true that
modifications need to be made in creditor remedies arising by operation
of law. For example, modification of the transferee's rights as a holder
in due course may be appropriate to aid the consumer in asserting meri-
torious claims growing out of the underlying transaction. The necessity
for modifying both creditor and consumer remedies must, however, be
determined on the basis of an evaluation of why creditor remedies seem
harsh and consumer remedies inadequate. The apparent harshness of
creditor remedies may often be the manifestation of a problem occur-
ring at a different point in the consumer-creditor interaction than when
the creditor asserts his claim. A more effective resolution may be found
by dealing with the underlying causative factor and not with manifesta-
tion of it occurring thereafter.
V. A CRITIQUE OF CONSUMER-CREDIT LEGISLATION
The aggregate of statutes regulating consumer credit represents an
authoritative and formal statement of the standards of conduct to be
observed by credit institutions and consumers participating in the
consumer-credit market and of the sanctions that may be imposed upon
those who fail to comply with those standards. As a formal statement,
consumer-credit legislation leaves much to be desired. It is overly
complex, often internally inconsistent, rife with surplusage, and other-
wise confusing and perplexing because of a lack of systematic order
and structure. These inadequacies are in no small measure attributable
to the fact that consumer-credit legislation is a conglomeration of
numerous distinct pieces of legislation enacted at different times and as
responses to apparently different problems. The failure of legislatures
to integrate or relate these separate pieces of legislation is not melio-
rated by the fact that much has emerged from the legislative process
reasonably well organized and constructed. Obscurity of provision and
absence of overall design are not, of course, peculiar to consumer-
credit legislation. In this type of regulation, however, the complexity
created by fragmentation has tended to conceal the magnitude of the
inadequacies in the substance of the regulation.
Consumer-credit legislation is not only fragmented in form, but is
also characterized by differential treatment of functionally similar ar-
rangements of various participants in the market. The latter character-
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istics, together with those generated by the fragmentation noted above,
are symptomatic of a fundamental difficulty, far more serious than the
fragmentation itself; namely, that the nature of the subject matter with
which consumer-credit legislation deals has not been clearly appre-
hended.
Consumer-credit legislation is not unlike other legislation in that,
in the long run, it is the instrument by which the community reinforces
its policy decisions and value judgments about a particular activity.
The expectations of the community about the standards of conduct to
which participants in a particular activity are to be held must be based
upon some underlying notion about the nature of the process in which
that conduct occurs. Such expectations are also shaped by the com-
munity's judgment that the continued existence of a process in a par-
ticular form and having particular characteristics is beneficial (or at
least not bad) and for that reason should be encouraged (or at least
tolerated).
Consumer-credit legislation reflects the underlying notions, as
muddled as they may be, that the community holds about behavior in
the consumer-credit market. It is also evidence of a general failure to
conceptualize particular types of credit, the negotiation of specific
arrangements, and the performance and enforcement of obligations
as integral parts of the general process of the consumer-credit market.
Within this market, general characteristics are shared, on the one
hand, by all participant-creditors and, on the other hand, by all
participant-consumers. For purposes of regulation, conflicts occurring
from time to time in the consumer-credit market, and abuses arising
out of those conflicts, have been identified as isolated phenomena un-
related to each other or to any unifying concept. Consequently, legis-
lative attempts at resolution of those conflicts have been specialized to
the particular phenomenon without reference to the matrix within
which it occurs.
It is possible that not only the fragmentation but also the dis-
parities and apparent inconsistencies in consumer-credit regulation
might remain, even if all consumer-credit problems were, for regulatory
purposes, treated as part of a "process." Differential treatment of
participants or arrangements is not, in and of itself, right or wrong.
One becomes suspicious about such differences, however, when all of
the available evidence suggests that their existence is not the result of
a cognitive decision to differentiate based upon intelligent appraisal and
analysis of the role of such participants or the function of such
arrangements in the consumer-credit market. The differences are,
instead, the predictable result of tradition and inertia, perpetuating
discrete treatment of credit institutions and credit arrangements.
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Even if differences in treatment of participants and arrangements
in the consumer-credit market, under appropriate analysis, may be
justified, irrelevant statutory prescriptions and sanctions cannot be
justified on any basis. In a number of areas, such as disclosure, a con-
sumer-credit statute will require standards of conduct of particular
participants in the market that, even if complied with, could not, by
any standard of measurement, claim to remedy the problem with which
it purports to deal because the regulation itself is unresponsive to the
need, inappropriate to the nature of the problem, and consequently
meaningless when its practical application is examined.
The irrelevance of specific regulatory provisions may be the conse-
quence of one or more specific evaluative errors. For example, the
nature of the abuse that the regulation was designed to correct may
be perceived inaccurately; the specific statutory provision may apply
the force of regulation to a phase of the process which bears insufficient
relationship to an abuse adequately perceived; the statute may specify
minimum standards for a class of participants in the market other than
those whose activities create or perpetuate the abuse; or the statute
may afford protection for a class of participants to whom such pro-
tection is not necessary. Although such errors may be the immediate
cause for specific incidents of irrelevancy, they are merely indicative of
another difficulty that inheres in all consumer-credit legislation;
namely, the absence of firmly postulated and clearly articulated objec-
tives for such legislation. It is an underlying and persistent confusion
and lack of clarity about the aims and functions of consumer-credit
regulation, coupled with a misconception about the nature of the con-
sumer-credit market, that produces statutory provisions characterized
by a curious kind of vagueness or unrelatedness to subject matter—a
double-vision effect produced by an imprecise superimposition of the
image of the legislation over the reality of the consumer-credit market.
Specific statutes now on the books reflect the legislators' uncer-
tainty as to the effects that such regulations are intended to produce or
at least approximate, largely because they never had any clear idea of
the results that they were attempting to achieve. To be sure, one can
say that the purpose of any specific regulation is to remedy a particular
identified abuse or conflict. However, the determination as to whether a
particular activity is an abuse, and if so, how it ought to be rechanneled
or eliminated, cannot be debated, let alone decided upon, in the absence
of some attempt to relate the activity to the operation of the total
process and to articulated over-all objectives for the process. Even
though specific areas of regulation, such as the small loan laws, were
at one time an appropriate response to defined and well-understood
needs, the notions originally relating to those laws have long since
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become obsolete because the nature of small loan lending has changed
as a result of the development of the consumer-credit market itself.
Consequently, those regulations cannot be assumed to be an adequate
response to the needs of the market or even a segment of the market, as
now constituted.
The consumer-credit market, like any other economic process, is
essentially a process of exchange." The general nature of the exchange
is shaped by the objectives and relative bargaining power of each of the
parties. Simply stated, the objective of the creditor in any such ex-
change is to obtain a profit, and the objective of the consumer is to
acquire credit for personal nonbusiness purposes. In almost any process
of exchange, whether it is consumer credit or otherwise, differential
bargaining power exists between the parties. The party in whose favor
the balance of power rests is better able to shape the terms of the
exchange to his advantage and to enforce rights created by those terms.
A differential in bargaining power generally exists because of the in-
equality of economic resources possessed by the participants to the
exchange. Other factors, not necessarily related to economic resources,
such as experience and acuity, may also affect the ability of one party
to achieve an advantage.
The significant characteristic of the consumer-credit transaction,
however, is that there is almost always a substantial balance in favor of
the creditor—a balance that gives him the power to shape any exchange
to his advantage. The creditor has greater economic resources that
permit him to obtain the advice of experts; he has, under the present
system of marketing consumer credit, more time to reflect about the
specific terms of the exchange prior to the time of contract negotiations
with the consumer; and he has more knowledge and sophistication,
derived from his own experience and that of others, about how to
strengthen his own position in consumer-credit arrangements. More-
over, although the creditor must make a certain number of credit ex-
tensions to remain in business, his stake in undertaking any particular
arrangement is not as great as that of the consumer: other potential
customers available to the creditor are greater in number than are
other sources of credit available to the consumer.
Both creditors and consumers possess other characteristics that
may affect the way in which they conduct themselves in the exchange.
Consumers, as a group, are no more or less well intentioned, respon-
sible, or moral than creditors as a group. In any exchange, one party
may, for example, be willing to take advantage of the other by resorting
to trickery or falsehoods. The factors accounting for the differential in
68 For an excellent discussion of the concept of exchange and its relationship to
social process, see Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life 338 (1964).
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bargaining power, however, permit the creditor who is prone to
irresponsibility or deceit to more readily take advantage of the con-
sumer. Moreover, those same factors make the creditor better able
than the consumer to adapt to or neutralize the impact of a single
imprudent or unfair exchange.
Another significant characteristic of consumer-credit exchanges
is that only a . few of the agreed-upon terms are truly the subject of
negotiation. Three interrelated factors account for this. First, as noted
earlier, consumer credit is marketed on a mass basis, and arrangements
have tended to become standardized. Only those terms of the exchange
that, by necessity, must be tailor-made for each consumer, such as
amount of credit extended and time for repayment, are generally the
subject of consumer-creditor negotiation. Doubtless, the cost of con-
sumer credit would become prohibitive if every term of every arrange-
ment were to be negotiated by the creditor and consumer, or their
attorneys. Second, the consumer is often so preoccupied with achieving
his primary objective of obtaining credit that he does not evaluate any
creditor's offer of exchange in terms of whether the benefit sought is to
be paid for at a higher price, in terms of dollars and relinquishment of
rights, than he perhaps should pay. The lack of sensitivity to contract
terms tends to prevent the consumer from considering alternative
arrangements that may be available to him in the market, limited
though those alternatives may be. Third, the superior bargaining posi-
tion of the creditor enables him to limit those matters that might be
the subject of negotiation.
The community has an interest in insuring that any process of
exchange between private persons conforms to a generally accepted
notion of what a private exchange should be, and that it meets com-
munity-imposed standards of fairness and decency. A fair and decent
exchange does not imply an even exchange; as a rule, no inquiry is
made into the relative value of the obligations undertaken and the
benefits derived by the participants. Furthermore, a differential in bar-
gaining capabilities of private persons transacting business is accept-
able to the community. The community does not, however, tolerate
such a differential where the factors creating it are such that the
exchange is not, and cannot under any circumstances, be considered to
be the outcome of a bargaining process. For example, infants and
mental defectives are considered to be incompetent to engage in a
bargaining process. Similarly, the community does not approve an
exchange in which one party has willfully misrepresented material in-
formation on which the other party has reasonably relied. The charac-
teristics which make a person incompetent to bargain, and the kinds of
representations that affect the validity of the exchange, are questions
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for the community to decide on the basis of its own notions of the
nature of a decent and fair exchange.
The problems that may be identified as existing in or arising from
the consumer-credit market are also the outcome of a system of private
bargain and exchange. Some of those problems are characteristic of any
system of private exchange (e.g., persons making improvident bargains,
or persons restorting to trickery and cheating). Others are attributable
to the special characteristics of the consumer-credit exchange and the
bargaining process leading up to that exchange (e.g., the superior
bargaining power of the creditor). Although the credit transaction has
been traditionally considered one of private bargaining, the character-
istic differential in bargaining positions generally prevents such an
arrangement from being a bargained-for exchange. To remedy this
situation, extension of consumer credit might be regulated like services
rendered by public utilities. On the other hand, one could take the
position that the terms of consumer-credit exchanges should be the
subject of collectiVe bargaining between groups of creditors on the one
hand and groups of consumers on the other. Whether the community is
prepared both to support the organization of consumers into effective
collective-bargaining units and to enforce collective-bargaining agree-
ments are further questions. Extension of consumer credit could, like
the system for distribution of public welfare funds, be made the
exclusive responsibility of a governmental agency. In such a case,
assuming the consumer were to pay the cost of credit as a purchaser or
borrower, rather than as a taxpayer, the terms and conditions of the
exchange could be established by the agency pursuant to guidelines set
forth in the legislation. Experience with public aid programs suggests,
however, that, although some of the disadvantages of the present
system of exchange might be eliminated, new and perhaps even more
serious problems could be created. The issue, however, apart from
difficulties in establishing and administering any of the above systems
of regulation, is whether the problems of the consumer-credit market
are such that they cannot be dealt with effectively without sacrificing a
basic community presumption in favor of a private system of exchange.
The community, since the first small loan legislation, has made
clear its preference for extension of consumer credit through a system
of private exchange. To the extent that exchanges made in an un-
regulated market do not meet community standards of fairness and
decency, it becomes necessary to impose those standards by community
prescription through legislation. What specific elements constitute a
fair and decent exchange for consumer credit? What are the indices of
the existence or nonexistence of these attributes in an exchange?
Assuming that operational definitions may be given to these terms,
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what type of legislative control, consistent with other values held by
the community, can be devised to shape the exchange to conform to
community expectations? An assumption will be made here that a
decent and fair consumer-credit exchange is one in which the consumer,
as well as the creditor, can effectively represent and protect his own
interests, and in which the nonnegotiable terms also adequately repre-
sent the interests of each. It is also assumed that the present system of
exchange does not meet these specifications. An attempt will be made
here to point out those aspects of the transaction that need regulation if
any real effort is to be made to make the extension of consumer credit,
as an outcome of a private exchange, conform to these standards.
Overextension by consumers, excessive charges by creditors, and
overly harsh creditor remedies are often identified as evidence of mal-
functioning of the consumer-credit exchange. One cannot say that
such problems exist in all or even most of such arrangements. What
constitutes excessive charges or harsh remedies for one exchange may
not for another; what constitutes overextension for one consumer may
not for another. Any legislative controls that attempt to deal directly
with these issues will be ineffective unless the control is such as to
insure an evaluation of each consumer-credit exchange, based on the
special circumstances of that exchange, by someone other than the
participants to it. Instead, legislation should attack the problems by
dealing with those aspects of the exchange, and, in particular, of the
bargaining process, which create the problems.
The nature of a private exchange is such that problems of the type
noted will always occur in the market to some extent. Controls should
be such that they minimize the possibility of those problems resulting
from the inferior bargaining position of the consumer. The factors that
give the creditor a bargaining advantage as well as an advantage in
enforcing the terms of the exchange can be modified by appropriate
legislative controls. For example, if all segments of the market were
opened to creditors generally, the consumer would have a greater
number and variety of alternatives to a particular creditor's offer of
exchange. Effective disclosure provisions relating to truly negotiable
terms of the exchange can provide the consumer with relevant informa-
tion on which to base his bargain and with which to consider alternative
arrangements. Time for reflection about terms of an exchange may be
provided by permitting the consumer to reject the arrangement within
a specified period after the formal documents are signed.
It must be recognized, however, that all terms of the exchange will
not, by the very nature of the market, be the subject of negotiation. In
these matters, regulation may have to take the form of specifying what
those terms may be. Since cost of credit is not generally a negotiable
item, perhaps rate controls in the nature of price fixing should be im-
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posed. However, if there is competition among creditors as to their
rate structures, and if the market is easily accessible to all creditors
for all types of transactions, rate structures may well be optimal, even
though the rates for individual transactions are not negotiated. If such
competition is lacking, the simpler cure may well lie in freeing or
stimulating it and not in trying to compensate for its absence with price
controls on rates. There is a real question whether cost can ever truly
be a negotiable item, but if an attempt is to be made to make it so,
then a realistic program aimed at creating consumer sensitivity to and
understanding of credit costs must be undertaken. It is questionable
whether the effective disclosure of credit costs before the consumer's
obligation becomes final is sufficient to accomplish this. Whether edu-
cational programs conducted by a state consumer advisory agency
under the mandate of legislation, coupled with meaningful disclosure
requirements, will be effective remains to be seen. In any event, the
present statutory approach of "ceiling" rates and cost disclosure pro-
visions that are of dubious informational value cannot be viewed as a
satisfactory resolution. Such an approach favors neither negotiable nor
nonnegotiable costs and therefore is no resolution at all. Many of the
creditors' present remedies might not seem as harsh as they seem now,
if other effective controls are established assuring fairness and decency
in the exchange. The consumer's ability to enforce his rights may be
enhanced by providing him with recourse to public agencies for pur-
suing complaints or by permitting him to assert his complaints against
a particular creditor in a class action with other consumers having
similar complaints.
All of the above devices are aimed at creating a true bargained-
for exchange by neutralizing, in some respects, the effect of the
creditor's present superior bargaining position. Even with appropriate
controls op bargaining, not every arrangement will be fair by com-
munity standards. The community should not consider unfair those
cases in which the consumer refuses to make use of effective aids
provided for him, even if the creditor may have taken advantage of
the consumer, unless the consumer is prevented from using these aids.
Such cases include those in which the creditor uses trickery or deceit of
a type peculiar to consumer-credit transactions, and those in which the
consumer has a special disability associated with membership in a
minority group, such as language difficulties. In such cases, it may be
essential to provide additional protection for the consumer. It may be
necessary to expand the definition of fraud to include particular types
of reprehensible behavior peculiar to the consumer-credit market. In
addition, the notion of unconscionability, as expressed in Section
2 -302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, may need to be modified in
order to insure its application to consumer-credit contracts.
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In summary, there is no question but that a complete reappraisal
of consumer-credit regulation is in order. Caution, however, must be
exercised in any reassessment. Existing legislation should not serve as
a basis for any new legislation without first appropriately defining the
subject matter of the new regulation and clarifying objectives for it.
An intelligent and thoughtful appraisal of the nature of the subject
matter requires an understanding of the market in functional and
operational terms and not in terms of traditional characterizations
based on source and type of credit. The consumer-credit process should
be defined in terms of the characteristics that differentiate it from other
economic or credit processes and that are common to all participants
and arrangements involved in the consumer-credit process. Legislation
must be viewed as merely an instrument by which to further or achieve
general community objectives for the process regulated. Consequently,
any determination about the nature of the legislation must be preceded
by a determination of the desired nature of the processes of the con-
sumer-credit market. In the long run, both consumers and creditors
have a community of interest in a viable, healthy market and in a fair
and decent process of exchange, and both groups should support efforts
directed at attaining this result.
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